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Morality may be defined as the problem solving activities of a moral
community, a primary group which uses a wide range of sanctions directly to
reduce conflict, which also sanctions perceived causes of conflict, and
defines and controls other deviances judged to be antisocial. So defined,
morality is a precondition for law. In comparing human with non-human
primates, conflict management is one of the most impressive parallels. This
empirical parallel is built upon, to construct an evolutionary scenario for the
development of morality and law in their proto-forms.
Selfish dominance consisting of pure physical coercion has nothing to do with law.
But when culturally patterned understandings about what is socially desirable
develop in a context tempered by dominance or authority, and in being informally
sanctioned they help to regulate social behavior, we speak of customary law. Such
sanctioning is practiced by all human groups, acting as moral communities which
agree on a code of prescribed and proscribed behavior. Moral communities
deliberately condition their members in directions they believe will promote social
harmony, and the more this purposive regulation of social conduct comes to be
formalized and institutionalized, the closer it approaches modern law based on
written legal codes, with formal judicial bodies, policing specialists, and a penal
system.
The continuum between non-literate and modern legal systems is well recognized
among legal anthropologists and others. However, extension of this continuum to
other highly social species or to hypothesized behaviors of our direct precursors has
been tentative. Gruter's ( 1977, 1979) general analysis of analogs to legal behavior in
non-human primates has been one important attempt to blaze a trail in this direction,
while Lorenz (1966) and Bischof (1980) point to a number of analogs to moral
behavior in other animals. By contrast,
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Kummer's (1980) assessment of moral homologs in non-human primates remains
negative. But this may be due to the rather restricted definition of morality he works
with.
PRELIMINARY SCENARIO FOR EVOLUT1ONARY
DEVELOPMENT OF THE MORAL COMMUNITY
I shall explore dominance, coercion, submission, flight, conflict resolution and
leadership as probable loci for the evolutionary development of protoforms of moral
and legal behavior in earlier stages of human evolution. I take for granted the
arguments of Tiger (1969) and Eibl-Eibesfeldt (1974), that bonding and positive
affect are also of great functional importance, but have not received their due in
socio- biological analyses of human behavior. My reasons for concentrating on
politics rather than love will very quickly become clear. Given the excellent data on
social dominance and conflict interference in extant primates, it is possible to
develop relatively specific, homology-based hypotheses on the origin of morality
and law, hypotheses specific enough to be tested for relative plausibility against
other such hypotheses.
It is difficult to conceive of the early evolutionary development of law, without
speaking first of the development of proto-morality and morality. Elsewhere (Boehm
1981c, 1981d) I have suggested that the origin of morality came through deliberate
interference in conflicts within co-operating groups of primates. Such interference
occurs among adults in many extant monkeys which exhibit dominance rankings,
and in great apes as well. Because such efforts apparently involve an intention to
restore social harmony, I have called them "prot0--moral."
These animals display less cooperation at the group level than is generally assumed
for protohominids, yet they are sufficiently sophisticated, socially, to manipulate
many exacerbated conflicts. It is assumed that protohominids also recognized the
value of social harmony and controlled obvious social problems such as severe
fights with still more insight. However, monkeys and apes must not be underrated.
They employ an impressive range of deliberate techniques to interfere in conflicts so
as to terminate them (Boehm, 1981d).
Certain of these extant primates, notably chimpanzees and orangutans, also are able
to recognize themselves in mirrors (Suarez & Gallup, 1981). In early humans, it is
assumed a similar but more developed capacity for individual self-conceptualization
developed into
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a sense of group self-interest, which by far transcended anything developed by
extant monkeys or apes.
The assumption, then, is that morality developed as a form of rational problem
solving. The hypothesis is that morality had its earliest roots in conflict
management. It later came to encompass group sanctioning of individual deviance in
other areas, including eventually deliberate limitation of raw power used by
dominant individuals acting as leaders.
Once all this happened and verbal symbolic communication arrived, restoration (or
maintenance) of social harmony by collective sanctioning, and subsequent
intentional regulation of dominance itself, were developments which provided
important preconditions for the evolutionary development of protolegal behavior,
and eventually of law. Minimally, this must have involved a set of agreed upon rules
of conduct, and some collectively espoused means for applying and enforcing such
rules.
This brief scenario provides a bare outline of the evolutionary sequence I shall try to
reconstruct. I now treat various aspects of the argument separately, offering a series
of rather specific hypotheses about the relation of social dominance to the
development of morality. Later, I shall integrate these hypotheses into a more
definitive scenario for the origin of morality and law in their proto-forms.
EIGHT HYPOTHESES
Hypothesis 1:
Prehominids exhibited behavioral lability.
Our precursors were capable of flexible adaptive modification, in Kummer's (1971a)
sense. In other words, the balance between genetic preparation and learning was
such that considerable flexibility in social organization was present. This means
under conditions of environmental change, that relatively major adaptive
modifications at the phenotypic level could be made rapidly. For example, upon
becoming more terrestrial this ape may have escalated its predator defenses very
quickly, through development of cooperative bluffing and fighting.
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Hypothesis 2:
In prehominids, there may have been relatively stronger preparations for
dominance, and weaker ones for submission.
I hypothesize that genetic preparations for social dominance mechanisms in early
hominids were comparable to those of great apes, baboons or macaques. It is
assumed that as largish arboreal primates our direct precursors interacted at group
levels above the nuclear family level, and such groups were adaptively dependent on
genetic dominance and upon the resulting social dominance hierarchies. More
basically, such groups consisted of bonded animals capable of recognizing one
another individually.
The potentially controversial assumption is that submission was less prepared
genetically, compared to dominance. This is based on the following reasoning. It is
widely agreed that our precursors lived arboreally. In such niches, many extant
species tend to display flight behavior in the face of dominant aggression rather than
submissive behavior which neutralizes the aggression. However, flight is not easily
substitutable for submission among ground dwelling primates because fleeing
animals are very exposed to predators.
To summarize this hypothesis, our precursors, adapting to terrestrial niches as
lakeside savannahs opened up, already had well-developed tendencies toward
dominance behavior previous to this adjustment. They had resorted mainly to flight
as an effective individual response to aggression, and this worked perfectly well up
in trees. On the ground, a social dominance hierarchy became still more critical for
group survival. But something other than flight was needed, if dominance
interactions were not to seriously damage reproductive success.
Hypothesis 3:
In protohominids, adverse effects of dominance were inhibited through
deliberate interference by third parties in conflicts within the group.
In making their adaptation to lakeside savannahs these apes developed largely
group-traditional controls on dominance behavior, rather than depending heavily on
flight or submission, as genetically well-prepared mechanisms. These controls were
built upon a previously less developed capacity for deliberately interfering in
internecine conflicts through a variety of strategies, the aim being to stop an episode
of exacerbated agonism.
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Such behavior is exhibited regularly in langurs, macaques, baboons, chimpanzees
and a number of other primates, conflict interference constitutes only a secondary
control on aggression. The primary controls are genetically well-prepared individual
submission, while interference takes over when such submission is ineffective and
an agonistic episode becomes exacerbated. However, among protohominids I am
hypothesizing that conflict interference, as a form of deliberate problem solving, had
to account for a much greater proportion of social control on dominance, compared
with any extant non-human primate. The resulting cohesive group was able to ward
off terrestrial predators, and eventually was able to hunt large game cooperatively.

Hypothesis 4:
Terrestrrtzl adaptation created selection pressures
favortng more socially sensitive individuals.
In macaques, much dyadic and triadic agonism is rather fully acted out through
physical contact and even fighting. In baboons, a greater proportion of such
communication takes place through posturing, gestures and vocalization. In
chimpanzees and gorillas, the latter tendency is so great that subordinates anticipate
aggression much of the time, or are able to pick up on very subtle cues because of
their greater social sensitivity. This is true of dyadic dominance interactions, but also
of triadic alliancing or interference situations.
As protohominids developed a greater dependence on interference, selection at both
individual and group levels favored a social sensitivity which permitted individuals
to anticipate the outcomes of dominance or interference episodes, and to modify
their behavior in advance. This brought selective advantages to individuals because
time, energy and physical risk were reduced, as costs accompanying the gains of
social dominance hierarchy. It also increased reproductive successes of groups as
semi-isolated breeding populations, as did increased cohesiveness and flexibility
resulting from such sensitivity. One result was an animal that was becoming
increasingly receptive, through learning, to social control; another was a tradition of
social manipulation far subtler than that of chimpanzees and gorillas.
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Hypothesis 5:
Tool use may have exacerbated dangers of intragroup agonism.
It seems probable that the homicidal potential of hominids was increased by tool
inventions which made predation on larger game possible. Particularly since canine
teeth suitable for ripping or slashing were absent, it would appear that even use of
large stones as hand-held " weapons or projectiles would have greatly escalated the
probability that intragroup conflicts might seriously diminish reproductive success
of a group. As a result of such inventions, selection favoring conflict interference
may have escalated concomitantly, through a combination of individual and
interdemic selection effects.
Hypothesis 6:
The moral community was a necessary development in the human line.
At some point, advanced development of self-conceptualization and sy.mbolic
verbal communication permitted verbal labeling and generalization concerning the
same obvious social problems which had been intuitively but deliberately
"managed" through conflict interference. This was the earliest manifestation of the
moral community which exists in every contemporary human society. Most likely,
the first problems discussed were ones of a violent nature: quarrels injurious to a
consensually appreciated group-interest in maintaining well-recognized forms of
cooperation. This involved conceptualization of collective interests as being more
important than individual interests. As agreed-upon rules of conduct were built out
of the experience of the moral community in social problem solving, proto- legal
behavior emerged.
The moral community may be defined technically as a primary group having a
conscious and collective sense of its own self-interest, which generalizes its
preference for social behavior into idealized models and restrictive rules, and
knowingly sanctions these preferences so as to condition individual behavior in
desired direction. As a precondition, there must exist the individual social sensitivity
mentioned in Hypothesis 5. But also individuals in the group must understand social
dynamics well enough to harness this sensitivity in manipulating the behavior of
individuals judged to be deviant.
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Hypothesis 7:
Dominance in leadership becomes regulated by the moral community.
As moral communities emerged, the already diminishing coercive dominance of
individual leaders was further limited. In part this dimunition was due to genetic
selection, since increased social sensitivity made coercive methods less efficient.
But it was also due to a growing individual sensitivity to public opinion, on the part
of followers and leaders alike. Thus, there came to be deliberate collective
curtailment of individual power, as a matter of right and wrong. This was the origin
of the egalitarian ethos so regularly exhibited by smaller extant human societies.
Followers began to decide exactly how strongly they wished their leaders to express
dominance, for which increasingly moderate genetic preparations still persisted.
Dominance patterns became heavily shaped by group tradition, since leaders had
become sensitive to subtler social pressures.
As groups came to manipulate their leaders through social pressure, an enormous
gap grew between protohominids or early humans and other primates, in the
expression of dominance behavior. This was significant both in the acting out of
dominance, and in its inhibition as well. The result was a less genetically dominant
species, but one which continued to have relatively strong genetic preparations for
dominance, compared with those for submission. Interference, and a more thorough
elaboration of bonding, did much of the job performed by submission gestures in
other terrestrial primates.
Hypothesis 8:
Timing was essential; when did the moral community and
proto-legal behavior arrive?
I have made these developments contingent upon the arrival of spoken verbal
language. However, it is emphasized that linguistic development need not have been
very elaborate, to permit conceptualization of group self-interest and generalization
about desirable versus undesirable varieties of behavior. The crucial factors are
capacity for self- conceptualization and an intelligent ability to generalize, not full
development of verbal symbolic language. Chimpanzees and orangutans (but not
baboons or macaques) are well along the road to self- conceptualization already
(Suarez & Gallup, 1981). And chimpanzees (with gorillas) have shown themselves
to be capable of learning and manipulating symbols inventively, in spite of limited
capacity for verbalization using phonemes invented by humans.
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Because there is no good evidence which limits the articulatory potential of our
precursors to form words in terms of phonemes different from those employed by
humans, one must place the advent of protolanguage ability in terms of development
of intelligence. Given the impressive capacities of chimpanzees in manipulating
signs, assigning an earliest possible date becomes difficult. So for the emerging
moral community this chronological hypothesis must re- main vague, but potentially
very early. Given the available evidence for technological problem solving, Homo
erectus seems a likely guess for definitive emergence of moral communities and,
presumably, of proto-legal "rules."
LOCUS OF SELECTION
In its broadest outline, the argument underlying these eight hypo- theses is so
generally accepted that it approaches being a truism to which deference is paid in
every anthropological textbook. A particular ape developed increasing lability over a
long period of time, and eventually became technologically very inventive, verbally
symbolic and moral in that order. However, there is actually a choice between two
major theories explaining how selection came to favor such lability. The strongly
predominant one (e.g. Leakey, 1961) holds that this was in the technological field
(invention of tools, etc.) while the other (e.g. Kummer, 1971a) favors the field of
social behavior as the locus for development of increasing lability and intelligence.
In extant non-human primates, it is obviously difficult to weigh the degree of lability
manifested in the social versus the technological sphere. But intuitively it seems that
lability is expressed far more strongly and with more variety in the social field than
in the technological field. On this basis, I join the minority to suggest that early in
the evolution of cultural capacity, selection favoring greater social lability could
easily have been the crucial factor. Kummer's ( 1971) arguments concerning benefits
of adaptive modifiability in social structure are highly suggestive here.
THE FULL SCENARIO
In thinking about various spheres of primate social behavior as to which are the most
labile, conflict interference is a well-qualified candidate, since this behavior involves
deliberate use of a number of different behavioral strategies to achieve an
impressively complicated end
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(Boehm, 1981d). By tying the evolution of social lability to this particular behavior
in its relation to social dominance, it is possible to construct a more specific
evolutionary scenario than is usually generated in the course of such speculations.
The immediate purpose is to explain the genesis of morality. But since "morality"
has been defined to consist of deliberate problem solving, the argument also explains
something about the earlier development of inventive cultural capacity, as well as
setting the stage for the emergency of law.
For lack of a better concept, one might treat the "aesthetic sense," broadly
conceived, as the locus of human problem solving ability (Boehm 1981b), since this
involves not only a bias in favor of pattern consistency, but a rather considerable
intuitive capacity for what academicians call "systems analysis." Conflict
interference in non- human primates provides a good example of this aesthetically
oriented problem-solving capacity in action: elsewhere (Boehm, 1981c), I have
argued that restoration of social harmony is the object, and that interferers make
rather complicated calculations with respect to social dynamics.
Conflict interference of higher primates not only involves a strong manifestation of
lability, but is proto-moral. For both reasons, I have chosen this behavior as the
logical area in which morality itself developed. This hypothesis is relatively specific,
yet well supported by the slender evidence available. It is difficult to identify
definitely by homology any other form of proto-morality in extant non-human
primates, as they behave in their natural habitats without human tutelage.
The scenario based on the eight hypotheses is actually rather simple. A behaviorally
labile and largely arboreal ape, exhibiting both social dominance hierarchy and some
conflict interference, moved into terrestrial habitats. There, due to increased predator
pressures, group size and social cohesiveness became crucial criteria for selection.
Whether or not genetic submission mechanisms were relatively weakly developed
up in the trees, selection favored labile conflict interference over genetic submission
mechanisms, even though both sources of variation surely were available. The
assumption is that interference was more effective than submission, given the new
terrestrial selection pressures. It is also possible that lability was being positively
selected on other bases, so that interference gained a selective edge over submission
mechanisms with some outside help, as it were. Technological invention remains a
logical candidate, here.
When chimpanzees interfere in conflicts, which is very infrequently
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in comparison with macaques and baboons, it appears that the interferer's cues are
more subtle, and that responses are more sensitive. Since these apes manifest a good
deal of dominance behavior in general, this marked difference cannot be explained
simply by saying " that there is less dominant aggressiveness floating around in
these species. Nor does it appear that individual submission is relatively more
developed in the apes to a degree that submission controls dominance so effectively
that interference is seldom necessary. Rather, it appears that interference is carried
out {and responded to) much more frequently by nuance.
I have suggested that in terrestrial prehominids, asocial sensitivity greater than that
of apes was selected mainly because this made control of dominant aggression more
efficient. Selection in this direction not only enhanced the capacity of subordinates
to respond efficiently, but also enhanced dominance interactions in general.
Small sacrifices of time and energy and fewer risks of bodily injury were demanded
by these interactions, as they became based less on physical attacks or serious
threats, and more on subtle indications which were expertly "read" by subordinates.
And this, in turn, led to Ian increased capacity for communication by non-verbal
signals. Of " course, leaders and followers alike became prepared genetically to be
more socially sensitive. As a result, it also became easier for followers to sanction
leaders when leaders acted agonistically not as peace- makers but as aggressors.
At this point, the protohominid we are discussing had developed a stronger degree of
proto-morality than any extant non-human primate, expressed through an
increasingly subtle tradition of conflict interference. It may be assumed also that this
highly social and still rather feisty creature was more similar to chimpanzees than to
any other extant primate. At the same time, its capacity for self-conceptualization
was being extended to include a relatively advanced, if still rudimentary, sense of
group membership. Concomitantly, the genetic basis for its problem-solving
"quotient" was growing, possibly with some additional help from technological
invention.
Verbal symbolic communication was probably necessary to formation of actual
moral communities, since as defined these collectivities developed shared evaluation
understandings about preferred and non- preferred behavior, and practiced
sanctioning accordingly. When such understandings are generally known and are
sanctioned, it is possible to speak not only of a sense of "right" and "wrong," but of
"rules." It is difficult to imagine the development of such under-
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standings without the advantage of a proto-language. But then, it is not easy to
imagine a proto-language in the first place. With respect to the development of
morality and of spoken language, it seems likely the two developed concomitantly,
along a gradual continuum. This means that language ability was not selected just
because it permitted better communication useful to the subsistence quest. It was
also selected because of its contribution to more effective social control, as a key
mechanism which permitted this socially aggressive primate to reap the benefits of
cooperation in predator defense, in the subsistence quest, and possibly in winning
encounters with other primates.
As I have indicated in Hypothesis 8, it is difficult to place the transition from protomorality to full morality in time. However, given the general intelligence and
aesthetic capacity of Homo erectus, as inferred from stone artifact production and
from the fact that large game was hunted, it seems possible that the moral
community arrived that early. The only other thing needed is development of a
proto- linguistic capacity to label behaviors and to assign them values publicly.
This scenario proposes a straight line development of conflict interference into
conflict management, as the original basis for morality. This constitutes a narrow
view of morality, compared with morality as we know it today. But potentially the
moral regulation of sexuality, property and homicide, as well as moral rules which
apply to veracity, are all intimately related to conflict resolution. All are likely
causes of conflict, and as conflict management became more sophisticated, it is
logical that its causes would be anticipated and dealt with in advance. With this
assumption, the incest taboo falls by the wayside for a candidate as the catalyst
which produced moral regulation of social life. I suggest instead that it was more in
the political sphere that morality developed, and that at some point after the advent
of the moral community, the egalitarian political ethos arose as aside effect.
IMPLICATIONS OF THE ARGUMENT
Moral communities of our precursors, whenever these arrived, signaled a new
development in the evolution of social organization. Social sanctioning was no
longer fully automatic, as in dominance hierarchies of chickens. Nor was there only
a small element of deliberate inventive problem solving, as in the individual conflict
interference of certain monkeys and apes. Social control became not only much
more deliberate and insightful, but also collective. And this
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brought about the genesis of morality and the basis of law. The scenario is based on
the assumption that our precursors may have started with relatively strong genetic
preparations for dominance, but with relatively weaker genetic preparations for
submission. In any event, instead of developing strong genetic submission
mechanisms needed to inhibit this dominance in their new terrestrial niche, they
developed more effective inhibitory mechanisms in the area of conflict interference
as a more labile behavior. As a result of increasing lability, genetic preparations for
dominance itself became weaker and less specific, but still remained stronger
relative to submission, compared with other terrestrial primates.
For all the attention the issue has received in the past seven years, the relation of
genes to labile behavior remains a realm of mystery. But still-prevalent
environmental explanatory fashions must not be allowed to obscure the fact that
humans are programmed to learn in rather specific ways (Pulliam & Dunford, 1980),
and in terms of rather predictable basic emotional reactions. It is at least interesting
to ask at this point whether contemporary humans may be somewhat better prepared
genetically to inhibit such behavior, both as submitters and as dominators who
remain responsive to submissive signals (obviously, in humans none of these
behavioral preparations could be very specific).
This speculative hypothesis fits with the evolutionary scenario. If plausible, it helps
to explain a phylogenetic anomaly in the human species. Our species is distinctive
for several reasons, one being that we develop moral communities, another being
that we practice genocidal warfare. A relative preponderance of genetic dominance
over genetic submission has already been hypothesized to be germane to the
development of morality as an inhibitory mechanism which controls dominance. It
may also be highly germane to the explanation of how warfare developed in our
species. Humans appear to be admirably equipped with a potential for homicidal
attack, which cultural development sometimes fosters. Potentially we also have a
relatively low level of responsiveness to submission, as far as genetic preparations
are concerned. It is not difficult to see why serious warfare might develop, as long as
it does not threaten species extinction, since so often conspecific killing is
effectively inhibited only within the primary group, or within a set of allied primary
groups.
To explain the existence of warfare in terms of morality, one must call on another
manifestation of the contemporary moral community, namely ethnocentrism. The
dual moral standard inherent in ethno-
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centrism (Le Vine & Campbell, 1972) allows outgroupers to be treated like animals
to which normal rules regulating homicide do not apply. Xenophobia exhibited by
extant terrestrial primates (Southwick, 1974) suggests that sources of variation in
this direction were available in our precursors, and this facilitates arguments that
ethnocentric moral double standards may be quite ancient-as ancient as the moral
community itself.
The result is a species which has been able to practice warfare for at least ten
millenia without destroying itself. One reason this has been possible may be that
while warfare involves a special moral license to commit homicide, it seldom
remains entirely ungoverned by rules. In this sense, 'international law' may be nearly
as ancient as the law which prevails within moral communities.
CONCLUSIONS
In conclusion, I suggest that the origin of the moral community, as a precondition
for the emergence of law, was the product of selective pressures attendant upon the
change from an arboreal to a terrestrial adaptation. Conflict interference provided an
increasingly efficient inhibitory mechanism to control destructive side effects of
social dominance and of culturally reinforced human propensities to be selfassertive in general, where these resulted in socially troublesome behavior. This was
a highly potent instrument of adaptation, by which humans usefully contributed to
their own adaptive success on a deliberate, perceptive basis. As cultural selection
became more salient, genetic preparations for dominance were weakened, being
augmented by selection favoring individual social sensitivity in leaders and
followers alike. Group self-conceptualization and verbal symbolic communication,
which probably arrived in tandem, made possible the development of moral
communities. In these communities, group sanction emerged as the most powerful
instrument for regulation of individually assertive behaviors, particularly those
which very obviously disrupted cooperation or disturbed social equilibrium needed
for group stability.
I have not spoken at all of duty, obligation, or other favorite abstract entities
favored by moral philosophers, although elsewhere I have suggested (Boehm,
1981c) that extant non-human primates exhibit something like a rudimentary sense
of social responsibility. But my argument is highly consistent with the philosophical
notion that moral behavior is intentional (Stent, 1980), since I have emphasized
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that moral behavior involves finding sophisticated solutions to per- ceived social
problems. It is on this basis, that I have treated the kind of conflict interference
exhibited by extant non-human primates as the prototype for moral behavior in the
human line. My interpretation is that this labile behavior involves some rudimentary
social sophistication, is highly intentional, and is oriented to an aesthetic
appreciation of social harmony, as well as to protective concerns for individuals and
to needs to assert dominance.
This interpretation may seem dangerously "psychological" or "mentalistic" to
ethologists who remain loyal to astrict behaviorist tradition. But arguing as I have
from an interface point joining natural science and behavioral science, I have taken
it as my perogative to be liberal, yet reasonably careful, in the interpretation of data
from primate ethology. In their specificity, the hypotheses I have developed now
await the scientific test of relative plausibility, in competition with alternative
accounts of the origin of morality and law.

